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TOWARD A COMPARATIVE APPROACH TO 
THE CRIME OF GENOCIDE 
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ABSTRACT 
  The annihilation of more than 1.5 million Cambodians at the 
hands of the Khmer Rouge is widely considered a quintessential case 
of genocide. Whether these atrocities meet the definition of genocide 
as a legal matter, however, remains unsettled. As of October 2012, the 
question of whether genocide occurred in Cambodia within the 
meaning of the 1948 United Nations Genocide Convention is pending 
before the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia 
(ECCC). The ECCC will determine this question against the 
backdrop of an ongoing debate about the appropriate scope of the 
crime of genocide. This debate pits expansionists, who believe the 
definition of the crime should be broadened to include mass killings 
of political groups, against restrictivists, who assert that genocide’s 
definition must remain tightly tethered to the crimes first articulated in 
the 1948 Genocide Convention. This Note finds both approaches 
wanting, and argues that the court should eschew dichotomies in 
favor of a comparative law approach to the crime of genocide. By 
approaching the crime of genocide in the Cambodian context as a 
legal transplant, the ECCC can achieve the uniformity critical to 
international law without sacrificing the cultural specificity necessary 
to ensuring that international legal principles remain locally 
meaningful. 
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INTRODUCTION 
More than 1.5 million Cambodians died at the hands of the 
Khmer Rouge between 1975 and 1979.1 The atrocities committed by 
the brutal regime defy imagination. Myopically focused on achieving 
an agrarian utopia, the Khmer Rouge fomented a revolution that 
swept across Cambodia with the destructive fury of a typhoon. In 
short order, money, markets, religion, education, books, private 
property, the family unit, and expressions of individuality were 
obliterated.2 The Khmer Rouge’s utopian vision created a dystopian 
reality in which one in five Cambodians died of overwork, starvation, 
deprivation, torture, or execution.3 The regime’s fall from power on 
January 9, 1979, left behind a shattered society that still struggles to 
comprehend its horrific past.4 
Despite the enormity of their atrocities, for decades the 
perpetrators were left unpunished, their crimes unaddressed.5 It took 
nearly thirty years for the Cambodian government, with the support 
of the United Nations (UN), to create the Extraordinary Chambers in 
the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC), a tribunal designed to establish the 
truth about what happened in Cambodia, provide reconciliation to 
the Cambodian people, and at last bring to justice the perpetrators of 
 
 1. See Youk Chhang, The Thief of History—Cambodia and the Special Court, 1 INT’L J. 
TRANSITIONAL JUST. 157, 160 n.3 (2007) (“The most commonly accepted estimates [of the 
number of people killed during the Khmer Rouge regime] today are between 1.7 and 2 
million.”); Ben Kiernan, The Demography of Genocide in Southeast Asia: The Death Tolls in 
Cambodia, 1975–79, and East Timor, 1975–80, 35 CRITICAL ASIAN STUD. 585, 586–87 (2003) 
(“We may safely conclude, from known pre- and post-genocide population figures and from 
professional demographic calculations, that the 1975–79 death toll was between 1.671 and 1.871 
million people, 21 to 24 percent of Cambodia’s 1975 population.”). 
 2. Cf. Chhang, supra note 1, at 159 (“Their first act . . . was to empty the cities and force 
their inhabitants to hard labor in the countryside. Then, they sealed off the borders, dismantled 
the country’s infrastructure and collectivized property. The only personal possessions most 
people were allowed were a plate and a spoon. The Khmer Rouge then turned on the 
population . . . .” (footnote omitted)). 
 3. DAVID CHANDLER, A HISTORY OF CAMBODIA 7 (4th ed. 2008). Exact death toll 
figures vary, and one in five is a conservative estimate. See supra note 1. 
 4. See Thomas Hammarberg, How the Khmer Rouge Tribunal Was Agreed: Discussions 
Between the Cambodian Government and the UN (pt. 1), SEARCHING FOR THE TRUTH, June 
2001, at 36, 36, available at http://www.d.dccam.org/Projects/Magazines/Previous%20Englis/
Issue18.pdf (“During my first mission to Cambodia . . . it immediately became clear to me that 
the Khmer Rouge crimes in the 1970’s still cast a paralyzing shadow over Cambodian society.”). 
 5. See id. (“The fact that no one had been held accountable for the mass killings and other 
atrocities had clearly contributed to the culture of impunity which was still pervasive in 
Cambodia.”). 
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some of the most heinous crimes the world has ever seen.6 The 
ECCC’s co-investigating judges indicted four former Khmer Rouge 
leaders in Case 0027 on September 15, 2010.8 The CIJs’ indictment 
thereby placed the question of whether a genocide occurred in 
Cambodia during the Khmer Rouge’s reign before the ECCC’s trial 
chamber9 for the first time. Therefore, as a threshold issue, the trial 
chamber will determine whether, as a legal matter, genocide occurred 
in Cambodia.10 
 
 6. See Agreement Between the United Nations and the Royal Government of Cambodia 
Concerning the Prosecution Under Cambodian Law of Crimes Committed During the Period of 
Democratic Kampuchea art. 1, June 6, 2003, 2329 U.N.T.S. 117, 118–19 (“The purpose of the 
present Agreement is to regulate the cooperation between the United Nations and the Royal 
Government of Cambodia in bringing to trial senior leaders of Democratic Kampuchea and 
those who were most responsible for the crimes and serious violations of Cambodian penal law, 
international humanitarian law and custom, and international conventions recognized by 
Cambodia, that were committed during the period from 17 April 1975 to 6 January 1979.”). 
 7. Case 002, Case No. 002/19-09-2007-ECCC (Extraordinary Chambers in the Cts. of 
Cambodia). For a collection of pleadings, opinions, and other documents related to the case, see 
Find Court Document: Case 002, EXTRAORDINARY CHAMBERS IN THE CTS. OF CAMBODIA, 
http://www.eccc.gov.kh/en/search/document/court/results/taxonomy%3A2 (last visited Sept. 5, 
2012). On September 16, 2012, the Supreme Court Chamber ordered the conditional release of 
Ieng Thirith, one of the four accused. Case 002, Case No. 002/19-09-2007-ECCC-TC/SC(16), 
Decision on Co-Prosecutor's Request for Stay of Release Order of Ieng Thirith (Extraordinary 
Chambers in the Cts. of Cambodia Sept. 16, 2012), http://www.eccc.gov.kh/sites/default/
files/documents/courtdoc/E138_1_10_1_2_1_EN.pdf. Ieng had been found mentally unfit to 
stand trial by the ECCC's Trial Chamber on September 13, 2012. Case 002, Case No. 002/19-09-
2007/ECCC/TC, Decision on Reassessment of Accused Ieng Thirith's Fitness To Stand Trial 
Following Supreme Court Chamber Decision of 13 December, 2011 (Extraordinary Chambers 
in the Cts. of Cambodia Sept. 13, 2012), http://www.eccc.gov.kh/sites/default/files/documents/
courtdoc/E138_1_10_EN.pdf. 
 8. Case 002, Case No. 002/19-09-2007-ECCC-OCIJ, Closing Order, para. 1613 & at 402 
(Extraordinary Chambers in the Cts. of Cambodia Sept. 15, 2010), http://www.eccc.gov.kh/
sites/default/files/documents/courtdoc/D427Eng.pdf. On April 11, 2011, the ECCC’s pre-trial 
chamber rejected the various appeals raised by the accused, thereby sending Case 002 to trial. 
Case 002, Case No. 002/19-09-2007-ECCC/OCIJ (PTC75), Decision on Ieng Sary’s Appeal 
Against the Closing Order, paras. 1–19 (Extraordinary Chambers in the Cts. of Cambodia Apr. 
11, 2011), http://www.eccc.gov.kh/sites/default/files/documents/courtdoc/D427_1_30_EN.pdf. 
 9. See Anne Heindel, Overview of the Extraordinary Chambers, in ON TRIAL: THE 
KHMER ROUGE ACCOUNTABILITY PROCESS 85, 108, 116 (John D. Ciorciari & Anne Heindel 
eds., 2009) (describing the role of the ECCC’s trial chamber to conduct trials and issue 
judgments against the accused persons after becoming seized of an indictment issued by the 
Office of the Co-Investigating Judges). 
 10. Other international tribunals tasked with determining individual liability for genocide 
have found it necessary to first establish whether genocide occurred. For example, the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) in Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-
96-4-T, Judgement (Sept. 2, 1998), http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/Case/English/Akayesu/
judgement/akay001.pdf, noted, “As regards the massacres which took place in Rwanda between 
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Although in the popular imagination the Cambodian massacre is 
an archetypal example of genocide,11 determining whether the 
atrocities meet the legal definition of the crime of genocide is no 
simple matter. At the international level, the definition of genocide is 
inextricably linked to the historical context in which it developed. The 
first articulation of genocide was a historically contingent response to 
the atrocities perpetrated by the Nazis during World War II.12 It 
represented a political product reflecting the compromises necessary 
to obtain widespread acceptance.13 To this day, the Holocaust remains 
the lens through which other cases of possible genocide are 
interpreted, which has significantly limited the number of incidents 
 
April and July 1994, . . . the question before this Chamber is whether they constitute 
genocide. . . . The answer to this question would allow a better understanding of the context 
within which the crimes with which the accused is charged are alleged to have been committed,” 
id. para. 112. The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) has also 
noted the importance of determining whether a genocide occurred before addressing the issue 
of criminal liability for genocide. See Prosecutor v. Jelisic, Case No. IT-95-10-T, Judgement, 
para. 101 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 14, 1999), http://www.icty.org/x/
cases/jelisic/tjug/en/jel-tj991214e.pdf (“[I]t will be very difficult in practice to provide proof of 
the genocidal intent of an individual if the crimes committed are not widespread and if the crime 
charged is not backed by an organisation or a system.”); Prosecutor v. Kayishema & Ruzindana, 
Case No. ICTR-95-1-T, Judgement, para. 273 (May 21, 1999), http://www.unictr.org/Portals/
0/Case/English/kayishema/judgement/990521_judgement.pdf (“A question of general 
importance to this case is whether genocide took place in Rwanda in 1994 . . . .”). 
 11. See Ryan Park, Proving Genocidal Intent: International Precedent and ECCC Case 002, 
63 RUTGERS L. REV. 129, 130 (2010) (“The mass murder perpetrated by the Khmer Rouge 
regime is popularly conceptualized as ‘genocide.’ It has been so labeled by sources as disparate 
as the United States Congress, United Nations General Assembly, countless media and 
scholarly publications, and domestic Cambodian efforts to memorialize and document the 
horror of the period.” (citations omitted)). 
 12. See, e.g., JOHN QUIGLEY, THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION: AN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
ANALYSIS 4 (2006) (“The mass killing by the Third Reich served as a catalyst to defining a 
crime to deal with efforts to wipe out a people.”). On one hand, the Holocaust is both “the 
paradigm of genocide and . . . the inspiration and prototype of the . . . genocide definition” in 
the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Genocide 
Convention), opened for signature Dec. 9, 1948, 102 Stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277; on the other, it 
is a “unique and unprecedented” incident, which “mak[es] it difficult to compare it with other 
mass atrocities.” MALIN ISAKSSON, THE HOLOCAUST AND GENOCIDE IN HISTORY AND 
POLITICS: A STUDY OF THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN HUMAN RIGHTS LAW AND 
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 23 (2010). This duality “pav[es] the way for the possibility that the 
Holocaust is contributing to hindering the prevention of other genocidal incidents as nothing is 
comparable to it.” Id. 
 13. See Beth Van Schaack, Note, The Crime of Political Genocide: Repairing the Genocide 
Convention’s Blind Spot, 106 YALE L.J. 2259, 2268 (1997) (explaining that the Genocide 
Convention drafters needed to respond to the “tragedy of the Nazi Holocaust” without “having 
the Convention inculpate Stalin’s politically motivated purges of the kulaks” to secure the 
approval of the Soviet bloc). 
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that have ultimately been labeled as genocide.14 Furthermore, the 
explicit omission of political groups from the definition of genocide 
that was enshrined in the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Genocide Convention)15 
exemplifies the practical compromises that were necessary to ensure 
widespread support in the harsh world of Cold War politics.16 
Ultimately, as a result of the context in which genocide was first 
legally defined, the majority of the Cambodian deaths may be beyond 
the reach of the Genocide Convention17 because many commentators 
attribute the Khmer Rouge’s crimes to the regime’s desire to purge 
Cambodia of perceived political enemies.18 
To determine whether, as a legal matter, genocide occurred in 
Cambodia, the ECCC may have to take sides in a debate over the 
appropriate definition of genocide, a debate that has raged since the 
Genocide Convention’s adoption.19 This genocide debate pits 
restrictivists, who seek to tightly tether any application of the crime to 
the text of the Genocide Convention, against expansionists, who 
advocate for a broader understanding of the crime of genocide.20 This 
 
 14. Cf. ISAKSSON, supra note 12, at 19 (“[T]he Holocaust has become and ‘continues to 
function as a lens through which to interpret’ other cases of possible genocide. . . . [T]his has 
implications for which incidents are branded as genocide.” (quoting DAVID B. MACDONALD, 
IDENTITY POLITICS IN THE AGE OF GENOCIDE: THE HOLOCAUST AND HISTORICAL 
REPRESENTATION 1 (2008))). 
 15. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, supra note 
12. 
 16. Van Schaack, supra note 13, at 2272. 
 17. See id. at 2261 (“A close reading of the Genocide Convention leads to a surprising and 
worrisome conclusion. The Genocide Convention, unlike other international legal instruments, 
limits the protected classes to national, ethnic, racial, and religious groups. As such, it does not 
cover a significant portion of the deaths in Cambodia.” (citations omitted)). 
 18. E.g., Park, supra note 11, at 131. 
 19. See William A. Schabas, Genocide Law in a Time of Transition: Recent Developments 
in the Law of Genocide, 61 RUTGERS L. REV. 161, 161 (2008) (describing “more or less incessant 
calls to amend the definition of the crime [of genocide] set out [in the Genocide Convention]”). 
 20. See Michael J. Kelly, “Genocide”—The Power of a Label, 40 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 
147, 157 (2008) (“Restrictivists seek to restrain the label’s usage to atrocities more akin to the 
Holocaust, while expansionists seek to broaden the label’s usage to include tangential 
atrocities. . . . What scholars now argue strenuously about is whether the definition of genocide 
covers . . . extermination and ethnic cleansing, and whether political groups should be included 
as protected groups.”); see also David L. Nersessian, Comparative Approaches To Punishing 
Hate: The Intersection of Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity, 43 STAN. J. INT’L L. 221, 223 
(2007) (“Perhaps the most significant criticism [of the Genocide Convention] . . . is that political 
groups are not among the human collectives that the Convention protects.”). One genocide 
scholar insists that a narrow definition of genocide is necessary to comport with the principles of 
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restrictivist/expansionist dichotomy in some ways reproduces a larger 
debate in the human rights field. In this larger debate universalists, 
who assert that human rights derive power from their ability to 
transcend local, national, or international laws, geographically as well 
as temporally, clash with relativists, who insist that human rights 
ideals should not be imposed uniformly across cultures.21 The 
interpretive approach employed by restrictivists in the genocide 
debate mirrors the interpretive approach universalists use to make 
sense of human rights. Similarly, the expansionist approach to the law 
of genocide reflects the relativist interpretation of human rights more 
generally.22 In light of these similarities, lessons drawn from the 
broader human rights debate can provide guidance to the ECCC as it 
approaches the definition of genocide.23 In the case of Cambodia, 
adopting an uncompromisingly universalist approach to the crime of 
genocide may undermine the legitimacy of international law and 
 
judicial fairness that “militate against liberal constructions of penal offenses,” to respect the rule 
against retroactive offenses, and to ensure that the Genocide Convention’s prevention 
obligations are not triggered too readily. William A. Schabas, Problems of International 
Codification—Were the Atrocities in Cambodia and Kosovo Genocide?, 35 NEW ENG. L. REV. 
287, 301 (2001). In contrast, expansionists such as Professor David Luban argue that the 
definition of genocide must be amended to guarantee that a restrictive understanding of 
genocide does not become an “excuse for inaction in the face of mass atrocity.” David Luban, 
Calling Genocide by Its Rightful Name: Lemkin’s Word, Darfur, and the UN Report, 7 CHI. J. 
INT’L L. 303, 320 (2006). 
 21. See, e.g., Kirsten Hastrup, Collective Cultural Rights: Part of the Solution or Part of the 
Problem?, in LEGAL CULTURES AND HUMAN RIGHTS: THE CHALLENGE OF DIVERSITY 169, 
169 (Kirsten Hastrup ed., 2001) (suggesting that human rights law has been stymied by “an 
unhealthy trench warfare between universalists and relativists, who have been unable to find a 
solution”). Universalists believe that the “elements of supranationalism and efficacy” in 
international law and its institutions can be “extremely powerful” tools that “might influence or 
even restrain the Hobbesian order established by the politics of States.” Leila Nadya Sadat & S. 
Richard Carden, The New International Criminal Court: An Uneasy Revolution, 88 GEO. L.J. 
381, 385 (2000). Relativists argue, in contrast, that “less hierarchical international criminal 
justice system[s],” which are more responsive to national concerns and “diverse perspectives,” 
ultimately prove more effective at ensuring international law’s goals. Jenia Iontcheva Turner, 
Nationalizing International Criminal Law, 41 STAN. J. INT’L L. 1, 1 (2005). 
 22. See infra Part I.A. 
 23. For the sake of clarity, this Note will employ the term universalist to discuss both 
universalist approaches to human rights and restrictivist approaches to the crime of genocide. 
Similarly, the term relativist is used to refer both to relativist interpretations of human rights, as 
well as expansionist approaches to the crime of genocide. Combining the 
restrictivist/expansionist labels used in the genocide debate with the universalist/relativist labels 
drawn from the human rights debate also serves to reinforce the commonality between 
universalist and restrictivist interpretive approaches on the one hand and relativist and 
expansionist methods on the other. 
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internationalized courts by rendering the acts of the Khmer Rouge 
unpunishable. A purely relativist approach is hardly superior because 
it threatens the symbolic and normative importance of recognizing 
certain rights as fundamental.24 Both approaches fall short of what is 
required. 
This Note argues that the ECCC should bypass this dichotomy 
and instead adopt a comparative law approach to the crime of 
genocide that draws upon the concept of legal transplants—rules 
moved from one legal setting to another.25 Unlike relativism or other 
culturally contingent modes of interpretation, the study of a 
transplant requires a more comprehensive assessment of the law, 
including how it originated, how it evolved, and how it differs from 
society to society, taking into consideration the “reciprocal influences 
of different legal systems . . . and the spread of legal ideas from 
culture to culture.”26 Moreover, the idea of transplants provides a 
useful tool for judges who are tasked with applying universal human 
rights in local settings. Judges can adapt widely recognized rights to 
discrete cultural contexts, thereby ensuring that universal principles 
remain universally meaningful.27 Despite these significant advantages, 
scant attention has been paid to the utility of legal transplants in the 
international law of genocide.28 
 
 24. See infra Part I.A. 
 25. See infra Part I.B. 
 26. William Ewald, Comparative Jurisprudence (II): The Logic of Legal Transplants, 43 
AM. J. COMP. L. 489, 510 (1995). 
 27. Cf. Sally Engle Merry, Transnational Human Rights and Local Activism: Mapping the 
Middle, 108 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 38, 39 (2006) (describing how legal translators adapt “the 
discourses and practices from the arena of international law and legal institutions to specific 
situations of suffering and violation”). 
 28. Although no one has written about legal transplants in the context of genocide, a 
survey of the scholarship on legal transplants in other fields may help orient this Note. For 
example, Professor Jonathan Wiener investigates the role of legal transplants in the context of 
“trans-echelon legal borrowing in global environmental law.” Jonathan B. Wiener, Something 
Borrowed for Something Blue: Legal Transplants and the Evolution of Global Environmental 
Law, 27 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1295, 1307 (2001). Similarly, Professor Julie Mertus describes the roles 
of nongovernmental organizations in transplanting “laws and, in some cases, entire legal systems 
from one place to another” in promoting the rule of law. Julie Mertus, From Legal Transplants 
to Transformative Justice: Human Rights and the Promise of Transnational Civil Society, 14 AM. 
U. INT’L. L. REV. 1335, 1378 (1999). Professor Bill Bowring addresses “transplant[ed]” human 
rights principles applied domestically in the former Soviet Union. See Bill Bowring, Rejected 
Organs? The Efficacy of Legal Transplantation, and the Ends of Human Rights in the Russian 
Federation, in JUDICIAL COMPARATIVISM IN HUMAN RIGHTS CASES 159, 159–60 (Esin Örücü 
ed., 2003) (“Perhaps [comparative law] can ease the pain of transition [toward global 
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Although legal scholars and practitioners have neglected to 
address the utility of a comparative approach to the crime of 
genocide, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda (ICTR) have not. These Tribunals have adopted a tacitly 
comparative jurisprudence to determine what genocide means in 
discrete contexts.29 This Note argues that the ECCC should embrace 
this comparative approach, treating the crime of genocide as the legal 
transplant that it is. A comparative approach to the law of genocide is 
superior to existing approaches because the use of legal transplants 
would enable the ECCC to interpret the legal definition of genocide 
in a manner designed to achieve uniformity without sacrificing 
cultural specificity without necessitating a redrafting of the law itself. 
This Note proceeds in four parts. Part I describes the existing 
approaches to interpreting international human rights law and 
demonstrates that the concept of legal transplants provides a useful 
analytical tool for making genocide meaningful in a variety of 
contexts. Part II turns to the law of genocide in international and 
comparative law, describing the historically contingent nature of the 
Genocide Convention and the existing international criminal law 
regime. It then describes the debate over defining genocide in 
Cambodia to illustrate the shortcomings of both universalist and 
relativist approaches to the law of genocide. Part III analyzes the 
tacitly comparative judicial approach to defining the crime of 
genocide adopted by the ICTY and ICTR. Part IV describes what a 
comparative analysis of the law of genocide at the ECCC would look 
like, the shortcomings of the ECCC’s universalist approach, and the 
concerns specific to Cambodia that should inform the ECCC’s 
analysis. Part IV then examines how the ECCC could approach 
defining the crime of genocide in the Cambodian context. The Note 
 
harmonization of law] by inventively smoothing out legal differences, creatively interpreting 
legal change to those who must accept it, or preserving familiar forms, concepts and styles of 
legal practice while adjusting their effects to meet transnational requirements.”). Professor 
Roger Cotterrell suggests that comparative legal principles offer a fruitful method for 
approaching human rights locally and even alludes to human rights as legal transplants. Roger 
Cotterrell, Seeking Similarity, Appreciating Difference: Comparative Law and Communities, in 
COMPARATIVE LAW IN THE 21ST CENTURY 35, 45 (Andrew Harding & Esin Örücü eds., 2002). 
Cotterrell, however, limits his discussion to the theoretical and does not apply a comparative 
approach to any particular human right. See id. at 45–46 (referring only to “human rights,” 
“fundamental values,” and “the essential nature of humanity”). 
 29. See infra Part III. 
SAINATI IN PRINTER PROOF FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 9/26/2012  1:19 PM 
2012] A COMPARATIVE APPROACH TO GENOCIDE 169 
 
concludes by emphasizing that recognizing genocide as a legal 
transplant is integral to ensuring the law’s defense of fundamental 
human rights. 
I.  DEFINING GENOCIDE: TOOLS OF INTERPRETATION 
The inadequacies of both the universalist and relativist 
approaches to human rights make the nuanced, culturally contingent 
comparative idea of legal transplants particularly appealing for a 
court that is tasked with applying the law of genocide in a particular 
local setting. If the ECCC adopts a relativist approach to genocide, it 
will have to redefine the law to fit idiosyncratic social needs by 
expanding the definition to include instances in which victims are 
targeted for not conforming to the perpetrators’ vision of their own 
national, ethnic, racial or religious identity.30 Alternatively, if the 
ECCC espouses the universalist approach, it will mandate a uniform 
application of the law across cultures and time and insist that “the 
Genocide Convention must be tightly tethered to its text, . . . thereby 
steering clear of broadly purposive, deontological reasoning.”31 Such 
uncompromising approaches to the law of genocide ultimately prove 
to be unsatisfactory. This Part assesses the inadequacies of the strict 
universalist and relativist interpretive approaches to human rights. It 
then discusses the advantages of approaching genocide as a legal 
transplant. 
A. The Limitations of Universalist and Relativist Approaches to 
International Law 
Purely relativist approaches to international law undermine the 
symbolic and normative importance of selecting and defining 
fundamental human rights as universal and inviolable.32 The relativist 
 
 30. See, e.g., Park, supra note 11, at 134–35 (“[H]istorian Ben Kiernan proposes the 
concept of ‘autogenocide’ to encompass instances in which the perpetrators and victims of an 
alleged genocide share the relevant national, ethnic, racial and/or religious characteristic, yet the 
perpetrators target the victims for, in their eyes, not sufficiently exhibiting the essentialized 
characteristics of the group in question (i.e., the urban, educated elite not being ‘true’ Khmers, 
according to the Khmer Rouge).” (citing BEN KIERNAN, THE POL POT REGIME 3 (2d ed. 
2002))). 
 31. Id. at 137. 
 32. See WIKTOR OSIATYNSKI, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THEIR LIMITS 175–76 (2009) (noting 
the importance of universal human rights as a set of “[r]ules that should be observed even when 
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approach rejects the notion that universal legal principles can be 
imposed on another culture without accounting for how local cultural 
conditions and values should temper their interpretation.33 In the 
context of genocide, for example, a relativist approach may 
encourage an overly flexible definition of genocide—one that can be 
stretched to encompass any instance of mass killing.34 Such an 
expansive definition could ultimately strip all real meaning from the 
concept of genocide, thereby divesting it of practical and rhetorical 
force.35 
Although international law has traditionally insisted on 
universally acceptable norms to regulate international interactions in 
a global society,36 an uncompromisingly universalist approach to the 
definition of genocide is hardly superior. Universal human rights 
movements have come under fire, cast as “‘civilizing’ crusade[s]” in 
which rights are wielded “as an instrument of global domination and 
neocolonialism” rather than as a tool to end oppression.37 This 
accusation stems from international law’s failure to engage with and 
adapt to local cultural settings. In the context of international 
tribunals designed to restore justice in the wake of mass atrocities, for 
instance, the failure to take local cultural values into account has led 
 
someone does not share—or does not know—the underlying philosophy” to prevent “grave 
abuses perpetrated in the name of cultural differences”). 
 33. See Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Designing Bespoke Transitional Justice: A Pluralist Process 
Approach, 32 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1, 68 (2010) (“Legal rules and institutions imposed in the 
ostensible pursuit of uniformity that do not incorporate or respond to competing normative 
preferences cannot succeed in their quest.”). 
 34. Schabas, supra note 20, at 290. 
 35. For example, Slobodan Milosevic brought charges of genocide against North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO) countries before the International Court of Justice (ICJ). 
Application Instituting Proceedings, Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. Spain), at 5 (Apr. 
29, 1999), http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/112/7169.pdf. Milosevic drew upon themes of 
relativism, arguing that genocide may be found any time victims of mass violence are members 
of a national group. Milosevic asserted that his Serbian forces were not attempting to expel the 
local ethnic Albanians through a campaign of fear and force, but that the Serbian police were 
attempting to “escort” Serbia’s Albanian population as they fled from NATO bombs. Tom 
Hundley, Milosevic Plays Blame Game at War Crimes Trial, CHI. TRIB. (Mar. 3, 2002), at 3 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 36. See JEFFREY L. DUNOFF, STEVEN R. RATNER & DAVID WIPPMAN, INTERNATIONAL 
LAW: NORMS, ACTORS, PROCESS 1 (3d ed. 2010) (“International law . . . dates back thousands 
of years, and reflects the felt need of most independent political communities for agreed norms 
and processes to regulate their interactions.”). 
 37. OSIATYNSKI, supra note 32, at 153 (quoting Makau Mutua, The Complexity of 
Universalism in Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS WITH MODESTY: THE PROBLEM OF 
UNIVERSALISM 51, 58 (András Sajó ed., 2004)). 
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local populations to dismiss the tribunals’ findings, thereby rendering 
the courts’ work—and by extension, the international legal system—
illegitimate and ineffective.38 
B. The Promise of Comparative Law: Genocide as a Legal 
Transplant 
In contrast to these uncompromising approaches, treating the 
law of genocide as a legal transplant compels an application of the law 
that is designed to translate genocide so that it makes sense locally 
without unmooring the concept of genocide from its universally 
recognized definition. Legal transplants metaphorically describe “the 
moving of a rule . . . from one country to another, or from one people 
to another.”39 As laws are transplanted, they must be adapted or 
“domesticat[ed]” to make sense in new cultural contexts.40 The idea of 
legal transplants thus works to undermine the perception of the law 
as a “coherent and consistent object,” and instead demands an 
“analytic, dynamic, and realistic picture of the . . . law”41—one capable 
of recognizing that the law takes on a multiplicity of substantive and 
structural meanings when it crosses borders.42 
The approach to the law compelled by the notion of transplants 
readily applies to international human rights, which are legal “values 
or beliefs” that have been translated into “legal form” and 
transplanted across cultures.43 During the transplant process, these 
values are exposed to reinterpretation and reappropriation, while 
 
 38. See Ramji-Nogales, supra note 33, at 28 (noting that locals frequently dismiss the 
findings of internationalized tribunals due to inability of the tribunals to “adapt to the local 
cultural context”); see also Mertus, supra note 28, at 1356 (“Legitimacy is central to the 
enforcement of human rights. Only human rights processes and bodies perceived as legitimate 
are taken seriously; only States perceived as legitimate can enforce human rights norms 
successfully.”). 
 39. ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE LAW 21 (2d 
ed. 1993). 
 40. Michele Graziadei, Legal Transplants and the Frontiers of Legal Knowledge, 10 
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 723, 728–29 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 41. Michele Graziadei, Comparative Law as the Study of Transplants and Receptions, in 
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW 441, 471–72 (Mathias Reimann & Reinhard 
Zimmermann eds., 2006). 
 42. See Edward M. Wise, The Transplant of Legal Patterns, 38 AM. J. COMP. L. (SUPP.) 1, 
12 (1990) (noting that legal transplants require “not simply a catalog of borrowed ‘traits,’ but an 
examination of the devices for cultural sharing and selection through which legal ‘unity’ is 
constructed and sustained”). 
 43. Cotterrell, supra note 28, at 48. 
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universalist notions are confronted by relativist principles that insist 
on acknowledging cultural differences.44 Transplant theory offers a 
mechanism for appreciating these differences, and provides both a 
method and a rationale for applying the “reasonable freedom of 
interpretation” necessary to making human rights principles 
meaningful in local settings.45 
This is especially useful for judges, for whom the process of 
translating human rights across cultures can be particularly fraught. 
Human rights law is highly controversial, not only because of the 
plurality of meanings “human rights” conveys, but also because of the 
close relationship that human rights themselves bear to political and 
economic forces.46 This tight linkage means that when judges, in either 
an international or domestic setting, interpret human rights laws, they 
do more than interpret law—they make a political judgment about 
the extent, nature, or existence of a particular right in their society.47 
In an effort to avoid overtly political or patently personal 
interpretations, it has become common for courts to refer to human 
rights decisions from foreign jurisdictions.48 This approach recognizes 
the “constructed [and] contingent nature” of human rights opinions.49 
As a result, in comparing foreign judgments, judges do not find 
“discovered truth” or “higher law,” but rather a record of the 
struggles that fellow judges in different settings endured in pondering 
how to resolve the conflicting human rights principles at issue.50 Thus, 
foreign judicial decisions are not adopted, but considered51 as a tool to 
sharpen judicial understandings of what an international human rights 
 
 44. Id. at 45. 
 45. Kirsten Hastrup, Accommodating Diversity in a Global Culture of Rights: An 
Introduction, in LEGAL CULTURES AND HUMAN RIGHTS: THE CHALLENGE OF DIVERSITY, 
supra note 21, at 1, 16. 
 46. Christopher McCrudden, Human Rights and Judicial Use of Comparative Law, in 
JUDICIAL COMPARATIVISM IN HUMAN RIGHTS CASES, supra note 28, at 1, 1. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 4. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 18. But see Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, 115 
YALE L.J. 1346, 1383–84 (2006) (“Courts are concerned about the legitimacy of their 
decisionmaking and so they focus . . . on [whether] they are legally authorized . . . to make the 
decision they are proposing to make. . . . Distracted by these issues of legitimacy, courts [ignore] 
the heart of the matter.”). 
 51. McCrudden, supra note 46, at 17. 
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principle means in the context of the court’s domestic legal system.52 
The transplant metaphor thus provides a mechanism for judges to 
approach these judicial reinterpretations of fundamental values, 
recognizing that although the human rights principle at issue may be 
the same, the context in which it is applied may lead to different 
interpretations, understandings, and outcomes. 
II.  GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW 
Legal transplants also have tremendous implications for the law 
of genocide—a law that is at once an embodiment of fundamental 
human rights and an articulation of an international crime.53 The 
definition of genocide that is memorialized in the Genocide 
Convention is recognized as the authoritative articulation of the 
crime.54 The vast majority of states have ratified the Genocide 
Convention,55 and the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has 
recognized that the Convention’s underlying principles are binding on 
states, even absent a formal conventional obligation.56 The law of 
genocide as it appears in the Genocide Convention is reproduced 
verbatim in the statutes creating the ICTY and the statute of the 
ICTR.57 Although the Convention’s definition of genocide is 
 
 52. Id. 
 53. The law of genocide sits at a nexus between international human rights law and 
international criminal law. With the ratification of the Genocide Convention in the aftermath of 
World War II, “the international community resolved, at least officially, to treat acts of 
genocide as criminal under international law.” David L. Nersessian, The Razor’s Edge: Defining 
and Protecting Human Groups Under the Genocide Convention, 36 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 293, 294 
(2003). Thus, genocide is situated within the realm of international criminal law. At the same 
time, “[g]enocide is focused on the right to life, and on racial discrimination. To that extent, the 
prohibition of genocide is at the heart of the values that underpin modern international human 
rights law.” Schabas, supra note 19, at 192. 
 54. Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind art. 17 cmt. 3, in Rep. 
of the Int’l Law Comm’n, 48th Sess., May 6–July 26, 1996, at 9, 44, U.N. Doc. A/51/10 (1996), 
GAOR, 51st Sess., Supp. No. 10 (1996), reprinted in [1996] 2 Y.B. INT’L L. COMM’N 15, U.N. 
Doc. A/CN.4/L.532. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Reservations to Convention on Prevention and Punishment of Crime of Genocide, 
Advisory Opinion, 1951 I.C.J. 15, 23 (May 28). 
 57. Compare infra note 62 and accompanying text, with Statute of the International 
Tribunal for Rwanda, S.C. Res. 955, Annex art. 2, at 1, 3–4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 
1994), as amended, reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 1602 (1994) (same), and Updated Statute of the 
International Tribunal Report of Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security 
Council Resolution 808 (1993), Annex, art. 4, U.N. Doc. S/25703 (May 3, 1993), as amended, 
reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1992, 1993 (1993) (same); see also Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace 
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ostensibly universal, it originated as a response to a particular 
experience, in a unique geopolitical context.58 Therefore, further 
applications of this definition in other legal settings require the law of 
genocide to be treated as a legal transplant.59 This Section considers 
the influence of historical context on the articulation of the crime of 
genocide and how genocide is perceived in the current international 
legal regime. It then distinguishes the ECCC from other 
internationalized tribunals, emphasizing how the ECCC’s unique 
features should influence its genocide analysis. 
A. The Historically Contingent Development of the Law of Genocide 
Acts of genocide have inflicted tremendous losses on humanity 
throughout the course of history.60 It was not until the aftermath of 
the Nazi Holocaust and the horrors of World War II, however, that 
the international community finally acted to outlaw the targeted 
annihilation of an entire group of people.61 In 1948, under the aegis of 
the UN, the international community defined the crime of genocide 
in the Genocide Convention as 
any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole 
or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: 
(a) Killing members of the group; 
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; 
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated 
to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; 
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; 
 
and Security of Mankind, supra note 54, art. 17 cmt. 3, at 44 (“The definition of genocide 
contained in article II of the [Genocide] Convention, which is widely accepted and generally 
recognized as the authoritative definition of this crime, is reproduced in article 17 of the [draft 
code].”). 
 58. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
 59. For a definition of legal transplants, see supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
 60. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, supra note 
12, pmbl., 78 U.N.T.S., at 278. 
 61. The annihilation of hundreds of thousands of Armenians by Turkey at the beginning of 
the twentieth century was the first atrocity to spark an official governmental response. 
QUIGLEY, supra note 12, at 1. In spite of the outrage provoked by the Turkish brutality, a 
generation passed before “an international crime [was] defined” to criminalize Turkey’s 
behavior. Id.  
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(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.62 
Three important restrictions in the official definition reveal the 
limitations that resulted from the context in which the Genocide 
Convention was drafted. First, the Genocide Convention confines the 
crime of genocide to acts ultimately designed to ensure the physical 
destruction or extermination of a group.63 This restriction implicitly 
excludes acts of cultural genocide, which contemplates “a vicious 
assault on culture, particularly language, religious, and cultural 
monuments and institutions,” but falls short of acts of physical or 
biological destruction.64 Second, international tribunals have 
emphasized the distinction between motive and intent.65 Thus, 
whether a perpetrator is motivated by personal greed, military 
expediency, or a desire to cleanse a region of a particular ethnicity 
has no impact on the specific intent to accomplish these purposes 
through genocidal means.66 Finally, the Genocide Convention 
 
 62. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, supra note 
12, art. 2, 78 U.N.T.S. at 280. In part, the Genocide Convention owes its creation to deficiencies 
in the scope of previously defined crimes against humanity. For example, the Charter of the 
International Military Tribunal Annexed to the London Agreement for the Prosecution and 
Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis (Nuremberg Charter), Aug. 8, 
1945, 59 Stat. 1546, 82 U.N.T.S. 284, which was used to indict the Nazis, characterized the 
destruction of European Jews as a species of crime against humanity. WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, 
GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE CRIME OF CRIMES 12 (2009). But the Charter 
implied that crimes against humanity required a nexus to an ongoing military conflict, which 
created a troubling precedent for future human rights protections. Id.; see also Charter of the 
International Military Tribunal Annexed to the London Agreement for the Prosecution and 
Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis, supra, art. 6(c), 82 U.N.T.S. at 
288 (providing for jurisdiction over crimes against humanity only “in execution of or in 
connection with” crimes against peace and war crimes). Ultimately “the Genocide Convention, 
not the Nuremberg Charter, first recognized the idea that gross human rights violations 
committed in the absence of an armed conflict are nevertheless of international concern.” Id. 
 63. See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, supra 
note 12, art. 2, 78 U.N.T.S. at 280 (“[G]enocide means . . . acts committed with intent to destroy, 
in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group . . . .”). 
 64. Schabas, supra note 19, at 171. 
 65. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Jelisic, Case No. IT-95-10-A, Judgement, para. 49 (Int’l Crim. 
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 5, 2001), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/jelisic/acjug/en/jel-
aj010705.pdf (describing motive as irrelevant to criminal intent); Prosecutor v. Kayishema & 
Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR-95-1-A, Judgement (Reasons), para. 161 (June 1, 2001), 
http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/Case/English/kayishema/judgement/010601.pdf (emphasizing 
that motive and intent should not be conflated); Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A, 
Judgement, para. 269 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999) 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/acjug/en/tad-aj990715e.pdf (noting that motive is only relevant 
as a mitigating or aggravating factor at sentencing). 
 66. Park, supra note 11, at 149–50. 
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expressly limits its protections to just four enumerated human groups, 
defined by race, ethnicity, nationality, or religion.67 As a visceral 
response to the atrocities of the Holocaust, the drafters of the 
Genocide Convention tailored the document’s language to “describe 
the widespread disapproval of the perpetrators of these events,”68 and 
it thus applies narrowly, “only to the losers of World War II.”69 As 
such, several scholars have cast the Genocide Convention as a 
“retrospective condemnation of the Nazi enterprise” rather than a 
mechanism to prevent and punish future genocide.70 
For these scholars, the Genocide Convention can be redeemed 
only if the definition of genocide it articulates is amended to explicitly 
include political groups within its protections.71 Such a radical step is 
necessary only if the ambiguous definition of genocide fails to make 
broad application possible—and this Note will show that it does not. 
If viewed as a legal transplant, the law of genocide can fit in a variety 
of contexts and settings. To this end, the inherent ambiguities in the 
law of genocide are actually beneficial, providing requisite space for 
the “reasonable interpretive freedom” necessary to domesticate the 
law.72 To take advantage of this interpretive space, legal translators—
such as judges and others who engage with legal transplants—must 
shun both strict relativist and universalist approaches to the law. 
B. Genocide in the Current International Legal System 
In 1993, the UN Security Council established the ICTY for “the 
prosecution of persons responsible for serious violations of 
 
 67. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, supra note 
12, art. 2, 78 U.N.T.S. at 280. 
 68. FRANK CHALK & KURT JONASSOHN, THE HISTORY AND SOCIOLOGY OF GENOCIDE: 
ANALYSIS AND CASE STUDIES 3 (1990). 
 69. Id. at 11. 
 70. Van Schaack, supra note 13, at 2268; see also Lori Lyman Bruun, Note, Beyond the 
1948 Convention—Emerging Principles of Genocide in Customary International Law, 17 MD. J. 
INT’L L. & TRADE 193, 206 (1993) (describing the Genocide Convention as “an ambiguous and 
weak document” with little practical effect). 
 71. See, e.g., CHALK & JONASSOHN, supra note 68, at 407 (“The world cannot afford to 
ignore [ideologically motivated] genocide simply because most of its victims were not selected 
as members of racial, religious, or ethnic groups.”); Luban, supra note 20, at 319 (“It is high time 
to revisit and revise the definition of genocide, to bring it into line with its moral reality.”). 
 72. See Hastrup, supra note 45, at 21 (“The challenge of diversity is still to allow for a 
certain freedom of interpretation: human rights must be both general and particular for them to 
work as a common standard of achievement.”). 
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international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the 
former Yugoslavia.”73 Since the establishment of the ICTY, the 
international community has established a variety of international 
tribunals to prosecute and judge crimes like genocide, war crimes, and 
crimes against humanity in countries from Sierra Leone to Timor-
Leste74 and including, notably, the ICTY’s “sister institution,” the 
ICTR.75 International legal scholars and practitioners frequently 
describe these institutions as “ad hoc” tribunals, a reference to the ad 
hoc manner of their establishment, which is “the product of on the 
ground innovation rather than grand institutional design.”76 But their 
success in addressing egregious human rights abuses set the stage for 
the International Criminal Court (ICC),77 the “last great international 
institution of the Twentieth Century.”78 The ICC was established in 
1998 after decades of arduous negotiations.79 The ICTY and ICTR 
proved that genocide and other human rights abuses were not beyond 
the reach of international law.80 The ICC builds upon this foundation 
by promising to end “impunity for the perpetrators of” atrocities 
“that deeply shock the conscience of humanity.”81 
Despite this promise, the ICC’s concern with universal standards 
of fairness, impartiality, transparency, and independence clashes with 
the priorities of domestic groups. For example, the ICC may reject a 
traditional conflict-resolution method for failing to meet the due-
process standards deemed necessary by universalist-oriented 
proponents of international justice.82 Concerns such as these have led 
many commentators to argue against “[a]n isolated and dominant 
 
 73. S.C. Res. 827, pmbl., U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993). 
 74. Ralph Zacklin, The Failings of Ad Hoc International Tribunals, 2 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 
541, 541 (2004). 
 75. Id. at 542. 
 76. Laura A. Dickinson, Comment, The Promise of Hybrid Courts, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 295, 
296 (2003). 
 77. See Sadat & Carden, supra note 21, at 396 (noting that the establishment of the ICC 
reflects the lessons learned by the international community from the ICTY and the ICTR). 
 78. Id. at 385. 
 79. Id. at 383–84. 
 80. The ICTY exposed the fallacy inherent in the notion that crimes like genocide and 
other grave human rights violations could “forever remain beyond the reach of international 
law.” Zacklin, supra note 74, at 541. Thus, “[t]he establishment of the ICTY was an important 
event because it showed that an international criminal tribunal could, in fact, work.” Id. at 542. 
 81. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, pmbl., July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 
3, 91. 
 82. Ramji-Nogales, supra note 33, at 21. 
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ICC” in favor of an international criminal justice regime that better 
reflects relativist priorities by collaborating with local governments 
and addressing diverse perspectives, local concerns, and cultural 
differences.83 
Recognizing the various legitimacy, capacity-building, and norm-
establishing problems faced by purely international tribunals, the 
international community began turning to hybrid courts,84 which 
blend international and domestic laws and procedures, allowing 
domestic and foreign judges to oversee cases side by side, and 
bringing foreign and domestic lawyers together to prosecute alleged 
perpetrators.85 The ECCC is one such hybrid institution.86 
C. Genocide in Cambodia and the Unique Context of a Hybrid 
Tribunal 
1. The Structure of the ECCC.  Unlike other international 
tribunals, which are designed to “advance a body of law uniformly 
applicable around the globe and wholly independent from the context 
in which its subjects are situated,”87 the ECCC, as a “hybrid tribunal,” 
is explicitly linked to Cambodian concerns.88 The importance of 
domestic concerns, processes, and actors in the ECCC is the result of 
efforts to harmonize the universalist views of the UN with the 
relativist perspectives of Cambodian officials. Wary of the 
international community’s motives, Cambodian officials lobbied for a 
predominantly domestic process.89 During the negotiations leading up 
 
 83. Turner, supra note 21, at 1. 
 84. Dickinson, supra note 76, at 300. 
 85. Id. at 295. 
 86. John D. Ciorciari, Introduction to ON TRIAL: THE KHMER ROUGE ACCOUNTABILITY 
PROCESS, supra note 9, at 13, 13. 
 87. Turner, supra note 21, at 16. 
 88. Heindel, supra note 9, at 85. Hybrid courts use a mix of international and domestic 
elements, including employing judges from both foreign and local judiciaries and applying a 
blend of international and domestic law. Laura A. Dickinson, The Relationship Between Hybrid 
Courts and International Courts: The Case of Kosovo, 37 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1059, 1059 (2003). 
Unlike other hybrid courts, the ECCC has “distinct national and international ‘sides’ that have 
separate hiring and reporting structures.” Heindel, supra note 9, at 87. It alone employs “co-” 
national and international prosecutors, and “co-” national and international investigating 
judges, as well as a method for victims to actively participate in the proceedings as civil parties. 
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 89. John D. Ciorciari, History & Politics Behind the Khmer Rouge Trials, in ON TRIAL: 
THE KHMER ROUGE ACCOUNTABILITY PROCESS, supra note 9, at 33, 67. 
